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Abstract 
We are skilled at reading other’s intentions – until they try to 
hide them. We are biased towards taking at face value what 
others say, but it is not clear why. One possibility is that we 
are uncertain, and make the decision by relying on heuristics. 
Some participants (n=39) judged whether speakers were lying 
or telling the truth. Others (n=40) did not have to commit to a 
judgment: they were allowed to say they were unsure. We 
expected these participants would no longer need to rely on 
simplified heuristics and so show a reduced bias compared to 
the forced choice condition. Surprisingly, those who could 
say they were unsure were more biased towards believing 
people. We consider two possible accounts, both highlighting 
the importance of examining raters’ uncertainty, which have 
so far been undocumented. Allowing raters to abstain from 
judgment gives new insights into the judgment-forming 
process. 
Keywords: social cognition; hidden intentions; heuristics; 
uncertainty; deception detection. 
Introduction 
We all live in our own private worlds, with our own beliefs, 
expectations and intentions. Our thoughts and intentions 
influence how we act, how we perceive the world, and how 
we engage with others (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). 
Those we engage with come with their own private worlds 
too, their own thoughts and intentions. 
Typically we are very skilled at picking up on what others 
are thinking (Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick, 1983) and 
tracking the social context (Richardson et al., 2012), but as 
soon as interests conflict people may decide to close off 
their private worlds and hide their true thoughts. And when 
they do, it becomes near impossible to tell: ability to detect 
when someone is or is not concealing something drops to 
near chance and people are biased towards believing what 
others say (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Why are we biased 
towards taking what other people say at face value, even 
when we have good reason to be suspicious of them? 
We consider one possible explanation: that people make 
use of relatively simple but experientially informed 
heuristics such as ‘people usually tell the truth’. They may 
rely on these rules because they are unsure whether the 
speaker is being honest or is hiding something, but 
nonetheless have to commit themselves to a judgment. 
There is much room for uncertainty. People are largely 
successful at concealing information, giving away very little 
in their behaviour (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine, 2010). 
And when people hide information from us we tend to be 
unsure whether the speaker is being honest or not 
(Anderson, DePaulo & Ansfield, 2002; DePaulo, 1992). 
When we are unsure, but forced to make a decision, how 
do we make a judgment? One way to simplify the task and 
reduce the uncertainty is to rely on a heuristic or rule of 
thumb (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Whether it’s because 
the rules of conversation imply that what is communicated 
is true (Grice, 1975), because people tell the truth far more 
often than they lie (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & 
Epstein, 1996), or because social rules encourage politeness 
over accusing others of being deceptive (O’Sullivan, 2003), 
there are good reasons to make use of a simple ‘people 
generally tell the truth’ heuristic. 
This paper considers whether raters rely on a truth biased 
heuristic precisely because they are forced to judge others 
despite being unsure. To test this claim, half of our 
participants had to make a lie-truth judgment (even if they 
were unsure). The remaining participants were additionally 
allowed to indicate they were unsure. We expected that 
because participants were no longer forced into making a 
judgment (and so did not have to rely on simplified 
heuristics), they would no longer show this bias towards 
taking what others say at face value. 
 
Methods 
Materials 
In a prior study we developed the Bloomsbury Deception 
Set (Street et al., 2011, April). Twenty-two speaker 
participants were approached by a junior researcher posing 
as a documentary filmmaker’s assistant. He approached 
people on the street near a London filming studio and asked 
them whether they would like to take part in a documentary. 
The researcher claimed he was short of time and, as a favour 
to him, asked participants whether they would tell us about 
one place they had been to and to make up a story about a 
place they had not been to.  
Those who agreed were taken into a filming studio and 
left alone with a senior researcher posing as a film director. 
Importantly, to the participants’ knowledge the director was 
unaware of that they had been asked to lie. The senior 
researcher explained he was both a director and a researcher 
interested in people’s true experiences in other countries, 
and stressed it was important that the accounts described 
were honest. Participants signed a waiver to this extent, 
stating they would be entirely honest in both deliveries. 
Participants then delivered either an honest or deceptive 
statement in response to the question ‘When you arrived in 
[country name], what was your first impression of the 
people there?’. They then answered this question a second 
time about a second country, this time lying if they told the 
truth first time, or vice versa. The junior researcher 
counterbalanced the order of the honest and deceptive 
statements (the senior researcher was blind to the order).  
Two speakers admitted they had been asked to lie, and did 
not deliver the statement. We believe this testifies to the 
effectiveness of our cover story, and shows that participants 
truly intended to mislead the director with their 
spontaneously generated deceptions.  
Although they were asked to provide statements of 
approximately 30 s, truths lasted on average 32.86 s (SD = 
10.79), and lies lasted on average 32.72 s (SD = 24.83). 
Two participants were used as a practice set. The 
remaining 18 speakers’ lies and truths (total of 36 
statements) were split into two video sets, such that a 
speaker appeared only once in a video set with each set 
containing 50% truths/lies. Additional details can be found 
in Street and Richardson (in press). 
 
Participants 
Eighty University College London psychology students 
rated the speakers in the above stimulus set. One participant 
withdrew consent retrospectively. Of the remaining 79 (54 
female), the mean age was 18.87 (SD = 1.31, range 18 to 
22). Participants received course credit or £3 compensation. 
 
Procedure 
Raters were instructed speakers would either lie or tell the 
truth about claiming to have met people in a foreign country 
they visited. No information was given about the proportion 
of lies to truths. 
Raters made a response after viewing each statement. 
Raters in the lie-truth (LT) condition (n = 39) made a forced 
binary choice. Raters in the lie-truth-unsure (LTU) 
condition (n = 40) were given the additional option of 
indicating their uncertainty. In this condition, participants 
had three response options to choose from: either they 
believed the speaker was lying, telling the truth, or they 
were unsure whether the speaker was lying or telling the 
truth. That is, raters viewed a video passively, and after each 
video either made a lie-truth or lie-truth-unsure judgment. 
 
Design 
The independent variable was the response condition (LT 
or LTU). The dependent variables were nonparametric 
signal detection measures of accuracy (A’: Rae, 1976) and 
bias (B”D: Donaldson, 1992), used as measures of how 
likely people were to be biased toward believing others. 
The calculation of these measures takes into account the 
veracity of the statements. A’ accuracy scores range from 0 
to 1, where 0.5 indicates chance accuracy and 1 perfect 
accuracy. B”D bias scores range from -1 to +1, where -1 
indicates a perfect lie bias, +1 a perfect truth bias and 0 
indicates no bias. 
 
Results 
Being able to explicitly indicate their uncertainty did 
influence how likely people were to believe others. But the 
effect was in the opposite direction than predicted: it 
increased the bias. 
In the LTU condition there were three response options. 
Random responding would lead to a lower percentage of 
truth judgments (33.3%) compared to the LT condition 
(50%), giving rise to artificial bias differences between the 
two conditions. To allow for meaningful comparisons, the 
unsure responses in the LTU condition were not analysed. 
Rather, we were interested in whether raters used the truth 
response more often than the lie response, regardless of how 
they made use of the unsure option (if that option was 
available to them). This allowed us to ask whether the act of 
forcing a judgment leads to a reliance on simple heuristics, 
which in turn causes the truth bias. On average, 17% (SD = 
12, range 0% to 38%) of LTU participants’ responses were 
unsure responses. 
The proportion of truth to lie judgments was converted 
into signal detection measures of accuracy (A’) and bias 
(B”D) to examine their independent contributions to the 
judgment. People may say truth more often than 50% 
because they are particularly accurate at detecting true 
statements or because they are biased towards judging all 
statements as true. Examining the raw proportion of truth 
judgments does not distinguish between those two 
possibilities. Separating accuracy from bias by using signal 
detection measures avoids this problem. 
Two independent samples t-tests found no evidence of a 
significant difference in accuracy between the LT (M = .62, 
SD = .16, 95% CI [.57, .67]) and LTU conditions (M = .62, 
SD = .20, [.56, .68]), t (77) = 0.09, p = .929, d = 0.02 
(Figure 1, top). There was a difference of medium effect 
between the LT (M = .16, SD = .45, [.01, .30]) and LTU (M 
= .38, SD = .50, [.23, .53]) conditions, t (77) = 2.06, p = 
.043, d = -0.65 (Figure 1, bottom). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Accuracy in the forced choice LT and the 
unforced choice LTU conditions. 0.5 indicates change 
accuracy (top). Response bias in the LT and LTU 
conditions. Zero indicates no bias; positive values indicate a 
truth bias (bottom). Error bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 
Artefactual vs. Veridical Truth Bias 
To better understand why the effect was in the reverse 
direction to our prediction, we reintroduced the unsure 
responses in the LTU condition data. The raw proportion of 
truth judgments were used because it does not make sense to 
calculate signal detection measures with three responses. 
There are two possible explanations of the effect. First, 
there is a veridical bias: that is, participants in the LTU 
condition made more truth judgments than did participants 
in the LT condition. This account predicts a difference in the 
proportion of truth judgments made in the two response 
conditions. A second possibility is that there is an 
artefactual bias: that is, LTU raters made fewer lie 
judgments instead electing to use the unsure response. This 
would lead to a greater proportion of truth judgments out of 
all the lie-truth responses, but as a result of using the lie 
response less rather than using the truth response more 
often. This account predicts a difference in the proportion of 
lie judgments between the two response conditions. 
Two independent samples t-tests compared the proportion 
of truth judgments and the proportion of lie judgments in the 
LT and LTU conditions. The proportion of truth responses 
showed no evidence of a statistically significant difference 
between the LT (M = .54, SD = .14, 95% CI [.50, .58]) and 
the LTU conditions (M = .50, SD = .14, [.46, .54]), t (77) = 
1.23, p = .223, d = 0.28, contrary to a veridical truth bias. 
The proportion of lie responses did differ showing a large 
effect, t (77) = 4.25, p < .001, d = 0.96. There were 
significantly fewer lie judgments made in the LTU 
condition (M = .33, SD = .14, [.29, .37]) than in the LT 
condition (M = .46, SD = .14, [.42, .50]), as would be 
expected of an artefactual truth bias (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: The proportion of lie, truth and unsure (where 
applicable) responses in the LT and LTU conditions. The 
increased truth bias in the LTU unforced choice condition 
results from a reduction in the use of the lie response. Error 
bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A second analysis explored the use of the unsure response 
in the LTU condition in more detail. Prior research suggests 
there is greater uncertainty when judging lies than judging 
truths (DePaulo et al., 1997). A paired-samples t-test 
compared the proportion of unsure responses in the LTU 
condition when rating lies versus rating truths. As expected, 
there was a significantly greater proportion of unsure 
responses when rating lies (M = .39, SD = .19, 95% CI [.33, 
.45]) than when rating truths (M = .26, SD = .18, [.20, .32]), 
t (38) = 3.40, p = .002, d = 0.15. 
In summary, after exploring the data it became clear the 
larger truth bias in the unforced choice condition was 
because the raters in this condition shifted away from 
making lie responses towards making unsure responses. As 
such, the proportion of truth to lie judgments increased 
because of the smaller number of lie judgments in this 
condition. It is also worth noting that deceptive statements 
were more likely to elicit unsure responses than were honest 
statements, replicating past research (DePaulo, Charlton, 
Cooper, Lindsay & Muhlenbruck, 1997). 
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 Discussion 
We are able to understand the thoughts and intentions of 
others with relative ease when they want to communicate 
them. But when they choose to close off their private inner 
world to us they do so effectively, to the point where we are 
barely able to notice the deception. We are biased towards 
taking what people say at face value, even in these 
experiments where participants were explicitly aware that 
some speakers would be concealing something from them 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
We considered one account in this paper. Raters have to 
deal with a socially uncertain situation, and to deal with that 
uncertainty they may make an informed guess using a 
heuristic. We considered whether relieving participants of 
the need to make a judgment meant they would no longer 
need to rely on these generally useful but somewhat error-
prone rules of thumb, and so show a reduced bias toward 
believing others. Contrary to predictions, we found raters 
were more even more biased towards believing others when 
able to abstain from judgment. Further exploration revealed 
this was not a case of an increased likelihood to believe 
others were telling the truth, but rather that they were less 
likely to label any given statement a lie and instead indicate 
uncertainty. 
There are two possible explanations of our findings. Both 
accounts assume raters are more unsure when they are about 
to make a lie compared to a truth judgment, as others have 
found (Fan, Wagner & Manstead, 1995). That is, we argue 
that exploring uncertainty is key to understanding lie-truth 
judgments, and that there is an asymmetry in the uncertainty 
between judging honest versus deceptive statements. 
As a first possibility, raters may become more cautious in 
their lie judgments when they can explicitly indicate 
uncertainty. They may begin believing the speaker is lying, 
but decide to hedge on the side of caution and say they are 
unsure. This may be indicative of raters giving heed to the 
notion of ‘innocent until proven guilty’. 
Alternatively, raters are typically more uncertain when 
listening to lies compared to truths (Anderson et al., 2002; 
DePaulo, 1992), with lies being harder to detect (Levine, 
Park & McCornack, 1999). Raters also have less experience 
with listening to lies than truths (DePaulo et al., 1996). 
When they are unsure, they may deduce that uncertainty is 
typically associated with people being deceptive and so 
infer that the speaker is hiding something. This would 
require raters can identify their own uncertainty by means of 
some meta-cognitive mechanism. This strategy would be 
adaptive inasmuch as raters typically are more unsure when 
they are listening to a lie, meaning in general this strategy 
will boost accuracy rates. 
In the first case, the rater in the LTU condition begins 
from disbelieving the speaker but changes their response to 
an unsure response. In the second case, the rater in the 
binary choice LT condition begins feeling unsure but has to 
make a response. Aware that uncertainty is usually 
associated with deception, raters in that condition make a lie 
response. The question is whether raters begin from 
disbelieving the speaker or from being uncertain. The 
current data are unable to distinguish between these two 
possibilities. What is clear though is that there is uncertainty 
in the judgment process at some level. Our research is the 
first to explicitly explore the effects of allowing raters to 
indicate their uncertainty instead of having to make a lie-
truth judgment. Forcing participants into a response when 
they are unsure may lead them into adopting strategies that 
have until now gone unnoticed and undocumented. 
It seems the bias towards believing what others tell us is 
not simply the result of making the best guess when unsure. 
When raters can explicitly say they are unsure, they are just 
as likely to say raters are telling the truth as when they are 
forced into judgment. The truth bias seems to be more 
complicated than making the best guess when they are 
unsure. 
But note that we are discussing uncertainty after raters 
have received all the information they can receive. During 
the early moments of judgment formation, as the speaker 
begins delivering their statement and when there is little 
information available to the rater, we might anticipate raters 
will make use of context-relevant heuristics like ‘people 
usually tell the truth’. With no other information to rely on, 
we may expect the early moments of the judgment process 
to be biased by these heuristics. A number of decision 
making models assume raters begin from a point of 
uncertainty, but that they can begin with a preference 
towards one judgment as a result of experience and prior 
knowledge (e.g. Richter, Schroeder & Wöhrmann, 2009; 
Roe, Busemeyer & Townsend, 2001). It is interesting to 
explore whether we show an early bias towards believing 
others because it begins to ask what biases raters bring with 
them to the social situation, which will have at the least 
some indirect effect on the final judgment. 
In summary, the tendency to believe others does not seem 
to be the best guess when unsure but forced to make a 
decision. Raters showed a similar degree of bias regardless 
of whether they were or were not forced into committing to 
a judgment. Rather, raters differed in how likely they were 
to rate a statement as deceptive. This may reflect an 
‘innocent until proven guilty’ bias, or a meta-cognitive use 
of uncertainty to make adaptive and generally successful 
judgments. These differences in strategy have so far gone 
unnoticed: allowing raters to abstain from judgment gives 
new insights into the judgment-forming process. 
 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Arndt Bröder, Alan Kingstone and 
Nigel Harvey for their comments on earlier versions of this 
manuscript. This work was conducted as part of the first 
author’s PhD. 
 
References 
 
Anderson, D. E., DePaulo, B. M., & Ansfield, M. E. (2002). 
The development of deception detection skill: A 
longitudinal study of same-sex friends. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 536-545. 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of 
deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 10(3), 214-234. 
Clark, H. H., Schreuder, R., & Buttrick, S. (1983). Common 
ground and the understanding of demonstrative reference. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 
245-258. 
DePaulo, B. M. (1992). Nonverbal behavior and self-
presentation. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 203-243. 
DePaulo, B. M., Charlton, K., Cooper, H., Lindsay, J. J., & 
Muhlenbruck, L. (1997). The accuracy-confidence 
correlation in the detection of deception. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 1(4), 346-357. 
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. 
M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in everyday life. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 979-
995. 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, 
L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. 
Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74-118. 
Donaldson, W. (1992). Measuring recognition memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 121(3), 
275-277. 
Fan, R. M., Wagner, H. L., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1995). 
Anchoring, familiarity, and confidence in the detection of 
deception. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 17(1 & 
2), 83-96. 
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction 
basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about 
others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
16(1), 66-91. 
Levine, T. R. (2010). A few transparent liars: Explaining 
54% accuracy in deception detection experiments. In C. 
Salmon (Ed.). Communication Yearbook 34. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Levine, T. R., Park, H. S., & McCornack, S. A. (1999). 
Accuracy in detecting truths and lies: Documenting the 
“veracity effect”. Communication Monographs, 66, 125-
144. 
O'Sullivan, M. (2003). The fundamental attribution error in 
detecting deception: The boy-who-cried-wolf effect. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(10), 1316-
1327. 
Rae, G. (1976). Table of A’. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 
42, 98. 
Richardson, D. C., Street, C. N. H., Tan, J. Y. M., Kirkham, 
N. Z., Hoover, M. A., & Cavanaugh, A. G. (2012). Joint 
perception: Gaze and social context. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6(194). 
Richter, T., Schroeder, S., & Wöhrmann, B. (2009). You 
don’t have to believe everything you read: Background 
knowledge permits fast and efficient validation of 
information. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 96(3), 538-558. 
Roe, R. M., Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (2001). 
Multialternative decision field theory: A dynamic 
connectionist model of decision making. Psychological 
Review, 108(2), 370-392. 
Street, C. N. H., & Richardson, D. C. (in press). Lies, damn 
lies, and expectations: How beliefs about the base rates 
inform lie-truth judgments. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology. 
Street, C. N. H., Tbaily, L. Baron, S., Khalil-Marzouk, P., 
Wright, K., Hanby, B., & Richardson, D. C. (2011). 
Bloomsbury Deception Set. Paper presented at the BPS 
Division of Forensic Psychology Conference, Portsmouth, 
UK. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under 
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 
1124-1131. 
